A Bush Flip-Flop-A-Day Keeps the Talking Heads Away*

* Busy trashing Kerry as the flip-flopper

Total count to date =  34

To send flipflops, feedback or comments, please click here. 
[Thanks to the following blogs/sites, where I got some of these links from: Atrios, Buzzflash, Talkingpointsmemo, Billmon, DailyKos, Dwight Meredith (Wampum) and Center for American Progress (CAP)]

1. National Security

1.1 We know we are winning the war on terror, or do we?

1.2, 1.3 We can win the war on terror! Can't! Can!

1.4 "Consequences" for U.S.S. Cole Bombers

1.5 Intelligence Spending on Counter-terrorism and Bush's Attack on Kerry

1.6 Seeing the first plane hit the World Trade Center on 9/11

1.7, 1.8 Threat to Air Force One on 9/11 and Civilian Flights Aloft as Late as 4 pm that day

1.9 Implementing Emergency Response Plans after First Flight hit the WTC on 9/11

1.10 Policy by Doing Polls on National Security

1.11 Finding Osama bin Laden Dead or Alive

1.12 Focus on bin Laden/Al Qaeda

1.13 At battle stations prior to 9/11

1.14 Using 9/11 or National Security or War as a Political Issue

1.15 Richard Clarke being out of the loop

1.16 Richard Clarke's Meeting with Bush

1.17 Homeland Security Department

1.18 Independent 9/11 Commission

1.19 Time Extension for 9/11 Commission

1.20 One hour time limit for Bush testimony before 9/11 Commission

1.21 Condi Rice testimony before 9/11 Commission

1.22, 1.23 Uncovering Every Detail about 9/11, in a Timely Fashion

1.24 National Intelligence Director

1.25 Access to Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) - Part 1

1.26 Access to PDBs - Part 2

1.27 Declassifying August 6, 2001 PDB

1.28 Providing 9/11 Commission Access to Clinton archives

1.29 Respect for the Dead

1.30 Release of Statistics on use of Patriot Act

1.31 Terrorism attacks in 2003

1.32 International Terrorism Cases in 2002 Fiscal Year

1.33 Strategic use of armed forces

1.34 Military Equipment Readiness

1. National Security 

1.1 We know we are winning the war on terror, or do we?

FLIP
1/29/02 - [Bush]: "We are winning the war on terror"
2/14/03 - [Bush]: "We're not only doing everything here at home, but we're doing everything we can abroad. Let me first tell you this: we're winning the war on terror."
8/15/03 - [Bush]: "Our nation is waging a broad and unrelenting campaign against the global terror network, and we're winning"
IN SHORT:
We are winning the war or terror, you hear? We ARE WINNING! We are making mincemeat of "terror"! "Terror" is terrified of us.

FLOP
10/16/03 - [Rumsfeld for Bush]: "Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? 
Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions."
10/22/03 - [Link]: "...White House press secretary Scott McClellan, traveling with President Bush in Australia, reacted by voicing support for Rumsfeld. "That's exactly what a strong and capable secretary of defense like Secretary Rumsfeld should be doing," said McClellan. "The president has always said it will require thinking differently. It's a different type of war," McClellan said...."
IN SHORT:
Er, we don't know if we are winning the war on terror or not. 

1.2, 1.3 We can win the war on terror! Can't! Can! [via CAP]

FLIP
4/13/04 - [Bush]: "One of the interesting things people ask me, now that we're asking questions, is, can you ever win the war on terror? Of course, you can."
IN SHORT:
We can win the war on terror.

FLOP
8/30/04 - [Bush]: "I don't think you can win [the war on terror]."
IN SHORT:
We cannot win the war on terror.

FLIP AGAIN
8/31/04 - [Bush]: "Make no mistake about it, we are winning and we will win [the war on terror]."
IN SHORT:
We can win the war on terror.

1.4 "Consequences" for U.S.S. Cole Bombers [via Hesiod]

FLIP
10/20/00 - [Link]: 
"Al Qaeda bombed the U.S.S. Cole in October of 2000. Here is how he responded to that attack, on of all things the Late Show with David Letterman!

"Letterman then asked Bush about the terrorist murder of 17 U.S. sailors [serving aboard the USS Cole] in Yemen. Seriously.

"If I find out who it was, they'd pay a serious price," Bush said of the bombing. "I mean a serious price."

"Now, what does that mean?" Letterman asked, a follow-up Bush doesn't often get when he's asked about such bravado.

"That means they're not going to like what happened to them," Bush said, and the crowd went wild.

"Now are you talking about retaliation or due process of law?" Letterman asked.

"Heh-heh," Bush said. "I'm talking about gettin' the facts and lettin' them know we don't appreciate it and there's a serious consequence ... And I'll decide what that consequence is."

IN SHORT:
Those responsible for the U.S.S. Cole bombing in Yemen will pay a serious price and face serious consequences

FLOP
Later in 2000/2001 [1]: [Newsweek]: "...The day after the Oct. 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole, the then candidate Bush said “there must be a consequence.” An FBI document dated January 26, 2001—six days after Bush took office —shows that authorities believed they had clear evidence tying the bombers to Al Qaeda. Yet the new administration mounted no retaliation of its own..."
Later in 2000/2001 [2]: [Blogger Hesiod points out:] "Now, we strongly suspected that Al Qaeda, and probably Osama Bin Laden were likely behind the Cole Bombing almost immediately. And we found a LINK between Bin Laden and the Cole Bombing by December of 2000. 
To make it even more clear, in March of 2001, Bin Laden himself PRAISED the Cole bombers publicly."
IN SHORT:
Those responsible for the U.S.S. Cole bombing in Yemen will NOT pay a serious price and WILL NOT face serious consequences

1.5 Intelligence Spending on Counter-terrorism and Bush's Attack on Kerry

FLIP
9/10/01 [The White House cut the proposed intelligence budgets on counterterrorism before and after 9/11/01 
(after U.S.S. Cole bombing by Al Qaeda, after repeated messages of threats of impending massive terrorist acts by Al Qaeda in summer 2001 and after 9/11)]

[Link]: "...In its final budget request for the fiscal year 2002 submitted on Sept. 10, 2001, the Administration "called for spending increases in 68 programs, none of which directly involved counterterrorism...
In his Sept. 10 submission to the budget office, Mr. Ashcroft did not endorse F.B.I. requests for $58 million for 149 new counterterrorism field agents, 200 intelligence analysts and 54 additional translators. Mr. Ashcroft proposed cuts in 14 programs. One proposed $65 million cut was for a program that gives state and local counterterrorism grants for equipment, including radios and decontamination suits and training to localities for counterterrorism preparedness." The WP reported that in its first budget, the White House left "gaps" between "what military commanders said they needed to 
combat terrorists and what they got." Newsweek noted that, among other things, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld elected not to re-launch a Predator drone that had been tracking bin Laden. When the Senate Armed Services  Committee  tried to fill those gaps, "Rumsfeld said he would recommend a veto" on September 9..."

[Link]: "...In the early days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush White House cut by nearly two-thirds an emergency request for counterterrorism funds by the FBI, an internal administration budget document shows. The document, dated Oct. 12, 2001, shows that the FBI requested $1.5 billion in additional funds to enhance its counterterrorism efforts with the  creation of 2,024 positions. But the White House Office of Management and Budget cut that request to $531 million. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, working within the White House limits, cut the FBI's request for items such as computer networking and foreign language intercepts by half, cut a cyber-security request by three quarters and eliminated entirely a request for "collaborative capabilities." ..."
IN SHORT:
Intelligence spending on counter-terrorism needs to be trimmed

FLOP
3/8/04 - [Bush]: "Once again, Sen. Kerry is trying to have it both ways...He's for good intelligence; yet he was willing to gut the intelligence services. And that is no way to lead a nation in a time of war." [This in itself is a false charge - see here]
IN SHORT:
Intelligence spending on counter-terrorism needs to be increased

1.6 Seeing the first plane hit the World Trade Center on 9/11

FLIP
12/4/01 - [Bush]: "I was sitting outside the classroom, waiting to go in, and I saw an airplane [the first] hit the tower -- the TV was obviously on. And I used to fly myself, and I said, 'Well, there's one terrible pilot.' "..."
[Bush repeated this several weeks later]
IN SHORT:
I saw the first airplane hit the first WTC tower on the morning on 9/11/01 before news of the second airplane hitting the WTC was reported.

FLOP
3/23/04 - [Link]: "Actually, no scenes of the first plane hitting the Trade Center were broadcast on television until late that night, when amateur video footage became available. The TV in the room where Mr. Bush waited wasn't even plugged in, according Ms. Rigell, the principal. "It's just a mistaken recollection" on the president's part, his spokesman, Mr. Bartlett, said in an interview. "There were lots of things going on fast at the time."..."
IN SHORT:
I DID NOT see the first airplane hit the first WTC tower on the morning on 9/11/01 before news of the second airplane hitting the WTC was reported. 

1.7, 1.8 Threat to Air Force One on 9/11 and Civilian Flights Aloft as Late as 4 pm that day

FLIP
9/12/01 [WSJ]: "As Air Force One left Sarasota, the president intended to return directly to Washington, Mr. Bartlett said. Mr. Bush initially had ignored advice from Vice President Dick Cheney, calling while en route to a White House basement command center, that Washington appeared to be under attack and the president for his own safety should remain away, according to an official in the vice president's office. Once airborne, Mr. Bush spoke again on a secure phone with Mr. Cheney, who relayed a new message that changed the president's mind, White House officials later said. The vice president urged Mr. Bush to postpone his return because, Mr. Cheney said, the government had received a specific threat that Air Force One itself had been targeted by terrorists. Mr. Cheney emphasized that the threat included a reference to what he called the secret code word for the presidential jet, "Angel," Mr. Bartlett said in an interview.
In a press conference on Sept. 12, 2001, then-White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the threat tipped the scales for Mr. Bush. The president reluctantly agreed to remain away from Washington "because the information that we had was real and credible about Air Force One," Mr. Fleischer said...
Days after the attacks, Mr. Cheney had said word of the threat had been passed to him by Secret Service agents...
In explaining Mr. Bush's movements, top White House political strategist Karl Rove has said that as late as 4 p.m. on Sept. 11, there were still reports of civilian jetliners aloft and unaccounted for, posing a separate threat to Air Force One. In an interview published Oct. 1, 2001, in the New Yorker magazine, Mr. Rove referred to reports of "three or four or five planes still outstanding" at 4 p.m..."
IN SHORT:
Bush did not return to Washington on 9/11/01 because of a threat to Air Force One, plus the risk of civilian flights aloft as late as 4 pm.

FLOP
3/23/04 - [WSJ]: "Although in the days after Sept. 11, Mr. Cheney and other administration officials recounted that a threat had been received against Air Force One, Mr. Bartlett said in a recent interview that there hadn't been any actual threat. Word of a threat had resulted from confusion in the White House bunker, as multiple conversations went on simultaneously, he said. Many of these exchanges, he added, related to rumors that turned out to be false, such as reports of attacks on the president's ranch in Texas and the State Department. As for the Air Force One code name, Mr. Bartlett said, "Somebody was using the word 'angel,' " and "that got interpreted as a threat based on the word 'angel.' "...
The vice president's office gave an account differing from Mr. Bartlett's, saying it still couldn't rule out that a threat to Air Force One actually had been made.
Days after the attacks, Mr. Cheney had said word of the threat had been passed to him by Secret Service agents. But in interviews, two former senior Secret Service agents on duty that day denied that their agency played any role in receiving or passing on a threat to the presidential jet...
But Benjamin Sliney, the senior Federal Aviation Administration official in charge of nationwide air-traffic control that day, said in an interview that there were no such reports. He and an FAA spokeswoman said that at 12:16 p.m., the agency informed the White House, Pentagon and other arms of the government that there weren't any additional hijacked jets aloft, as all commercial planes had landed or been diverted away from the U.S.
Other government officials said in interviews that Mr. Bush received a briefing before 1 p.m. while at an Air Force base in Barksdale, La., during which he was told that the skies were clear of any potentially hijacked planes. Mr. Bartlett said in an interview he didn't know where Mr. Rove got the information about planes still being in the air in the late afternoon of Sept. 11..."
IN SHORT:
There was no real threat to Air Force One on 9/11/01. There were no civilian flights aloft as late as 4 pm. 

1.9 Implementing Emergency Response Plans after First Flight hit the WTC on 9/11

FLIP
9/11/01 - [Bush]: "...immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency-response plans"
IN SHORT:
I implemented the Government's emergency response plans immediately after the first attack on 9/11.

FLOP
3/23/04 - [WSJ]: "But in interviews, federal officials said that in fact, lower-level government employees activated the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan. 
Adopted in the late 1990s in response to an executive order from President Clinton, the 36-page "Conplan" details the responsibilities of seven federal agencies. It gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation responsibility for activating the plan and alerting the other agencies that a terrorist attack has occurred.
FBI spokesman Paul Bresson said the Conplan was activated quickly on Sept. 11, without any input from the president or White House. Because the Trade Center crashes were so widely known from television coverage, he said, most of the participating federal agencies swung into action without waiting for FBI notification.
A former Bush White House official said in an e-mail response to questions that the president "was actually not involved in making decision on 9/11 about emergency plans until he formally signed a disaster declaration" three days later, on Sept. 14. The White House didn't respond to written questions about the president's role in activating the Conplan."
IN SHORT:
I was not the one who implemented the Government's emergency response plans immediately after the first attack on 9/11.

1.10 Policy by Doing Polls on National Security [via Liberal Oasis]

FLIP
Late 2001 - [Bush]: "Halfway through lunch, President Bush dropped by unexpectedly and launched into an impromptu briefing of his own, ticking off the items on his agenda until he arrived at the question of whether it was preferable to issue vague warnings of possible terrorist threats or to stay quietly vigilant so as not to alarm people. At this point, former Clinton press secretary Dee Dee Myers piped up, "What do the poll numbers say?" All eyes turned to Bush. Without missing a beat, the famous Bush smirk crossed the president's face and he replied, "In this White House, Dee Dee, we don't poll on something as important as national security."..."
2/18/03 - [Bush]: "First of all, you know, size of protest, it's like deciding, well, I'm going to decide policy based upon a focus group. The role of a leader is to decide policy based upon the security -- in this case, the security of the people."
IN SHORT:
In this White House we don't use polls or focus groups to decide national security policy.

FLOP 
2/14/03 - [Tom Ridge for Bush]: "As we roll out the broader communications strategy, [we] have done quite a bit of work with professionals around the country -- who include focus groups -- as a way to communicate the message that really helps people feel empowered and educated rather than alarmed."
BONUS
11/16/02 - [Link]: "..."Bush at War," by Washington Post assistant managing editor Bob Woodward, draws on four hours of interviews with Bush and quotes 15,000 words from National Security Council and other White House meetings in reconstructing the internal debate that led to U.S. military action in Afghanistan and the decision to aggressively confront Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. ...
The president is shown to be preoccupied by public perceptions of the war, looking at polling data from Rove, now his senior adviser, even after pretending to have no interest. 
Roger E. Ailes, a media coach for Bush's father and now chairman of the Fox News Channel, sent a confidential communication to the White House in the weeks after the terrorist attacks. Rove took the Ailes communication to the president. "His back-channel message: The American public would tolerate waiting and would be patient, but only as long as they were convinced that Bush was using the harshest measures possible," Woodward wrote. He added that Ailes, who has angrily challenged reports that his news channel has a conservative bias, added a warning: "Support would dissipate if the public did not see Bush acting harshly." ..."
IN SHORT:
In this White House we DO use polls or focus groups to decide national security policy.

1.11 Finding Osama bin Laden Dead or Alive

FLIP
9/13/01 - [Bush]: "...The most important thing is for us to find Osama bin Laden. It is our number one priority and we will not rest until we find him..."
IN SHORT:
Finding Osama bin Laden is important and our #1 priority and we will not rest until we find him.

3/13/02 - [Bush]: "I don't know where bin Laden is. I have no idea and really don't care. It's not that important. It's not our priority." 
4/8/02 - [Bush]: "...I am truly not that concerned about him."
IN SHORT:
Finding Osama bin Laden is NOT important and not our priority. And, by the way, I couldn't care less.

Compassiongate Note on the above struck-out links: Per this post by Atrios, it is not clear if the quotes above are real. Since the authenticity of the quotes has been questioned and I can't verify them independently I am striking them out and replacing them with the combination below. I am leaving the struck out regions to point out that this is a correction.

FLIP
9/17/01 - [Link]: "Bush Wants Bin Laden, Dead or Alive...
I want justice," said Bush. "There's an old poster out West that said: 'Wanted, dead or alive.' "
Bush cautioned the nation it faces "a different type of war ... a different type of enemy than we're used to. ... Their network is extensive. There are no rules. They slit the throats of women who are on airplanes." 
Asked about his comment about a wanted poster, he replied, "All I'm doing is remembering when I was a kid. I remember they used to put out there in the Old West wanted posters that said 'Wanted dead or alive.' All I want and America wants him brought to justice. That's what I want."
Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer later said that a presidential directive barring the U.S. government from engaging in assassination "does not limit the United States' ability to act in its self defense."..."
IN SHORT: 
I want Osama bin Laden Dead or Alive and he should be brought to justice.

FLOP
3/13/02 - [Link]: "So I don't know where he is. You know, I just don't spend that much time on him, Kelly, to be honest with you...
Well, as I say, we haven't heard much from him. And I wouldn't necessarily say he's at the center of any command structure. And, again, I don't know where he is. I -- I'll repeat what I said. I truly am not that concerned about him. I know he is on the run."
IN SHORT: 
I am not really concerned about Osama Bin Laden and I don't spend much time on him (remember how I was before 9/11?) 

1.12 Focus on bin Laden/Al Qaeda

FLOP
March 2004 - [Wilkinson for Bush]: "...This is a president who wanted a comprehensive strategy to go after al Qaeda where it lives, where it hides, where it plots, where it raises money. All the ideas that -- except for one -- that Dick Clarke submitted, this administration did..."
March 2004 - [Cheney for Bush]: "The fact is, what the President did not want to do is to have an ineffective response with respect to al Qaeda. And we felt that up until that point that much of what had been done vis-a-vis al Qaeda had been totally ineffective: some cruise missiles fired at some training camps in Afghanistan that basically didn't hit anything. And it made the U.S. look weak and ineffective. And he wanted a far more effective policy for trying to deal with that. And that process was in motion throughout the spring."
IN SHORT:
We (including Bush) were very much focused on dealing with Al Qaeda and bin Laden prior to 9/11.

FLIP
Flashback to 2001/2002 - [Link]: "In this case, Clarke himself told scribes where to go. Yep! He sent them straight to this passage in Woodward: WOODWARD (page 39): [Bush] acknowledged that bin Laden was not his focus or that of his national security team. “There was a significant difference in my attitude after September 11. I was not on point…I didn’t have that sense of urgency, and my blood was not nearly as boiling.”..."
More flashback to 2001/2002 - [Bush]: "I didn’t feel a sense of urgency about al Qaeda. It was not my focus; it was not the focus of my team"
IN SHORT:
Osama bin Laden/Al Qaeda was not our focus prior to 9/11. We were "not on point" before 9/11.

1.13 At battle stations prior to 9/11

FLOP
4/8/04 - [Rice for Bush, testifying to 9/11 Commission]: "...I talked to Powell, I talked to Rumsfeld about what was happening with the threats and with the alerts, and the president of the United States had us at battle stations during this period of time..."
IN SHORT:
We were at battle stations prior to 9/11 because of the known threats.

FLIP
4/8/04 (yes, same day) - [Rice for Bush, testifying to 9/11 Commission]: "...for all the language of war spoken before September 11th, this country simply was not on war footing...
And for all of the rhetoric of war prior to 9/11 -- people who said we're at war with the jihadist network, people who said that they've declared war on us and we're at war with them -- we weren't at war. We weren't on war footing. We weren't behaving in that way."
IN SHORT:
We were NOT really on a war footing prior to 9/11 in spite of the known threats.

1.14 Using 9/11 or National Security or War as a Political Issue

FLIP
1/23/02 - [Bush]: "...I have no ambition whatsoever to use this [9/11 or national security or war] as a political issue..."
IN SHORT:
I will not use 9/11 or national security or war as a political issue

FLOP
1/19/02 and beyond - [Link]:
"On 1/23/02, President Bush said, " I have no ambition whatsoever to use [national security] as a political issue." On 5/17/02, Vice President Cheney even said legitimate questions about the White House's failure to better defend America before 9/11 were "thoroughly irresponsible and totally unworthy of national leaders in a time of war."
...
Less than 19 weeks after the 9/11 attacks, top White House adviser Karl Rove gave a speech on 1/19/02 urging fellow conservatives to "go to the country" on issues surrounding the War on Terror, an invitation to politicize national security in an election year, as he claimed Americans trust conservatives to do a better job of "protecting America." The NYT noted that the White House had effectively "rolled out of a strategy branding anyone who questions the administration as 'giving aid and comfort to our enemies,'" as Rep. Tom Davis (R-VA) said.
In March 2002, AP reported that in speeches, President Bush began "making the defense budget a patriotic issue." The story noted that "despite the lack of concerted opposition," Bush was seeking partisan political gain from the traditionally bipartisan issue of defense spending.
On 5/15/02, CNN reported the White House allowed political campaign committees to use an official, taxpayer-funded photograph of President Bush taken on September 11 to be sold to fat cats at political fundraisers. The photograph, paid for with government money, "shows Bush aboard Air Force One, talking to Vice President Dick Cheney hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon." The picture was being offered "to donors who contribute at least $150 and attend a fund-raising dinner with Bush and the first lady."
The Associated Press reported on 6/13/02 that the White House began urging conservatives to push "messages highlighting the war on terrorism" according to a presentation formulated by top Presidential advisers in the White House. On 9/26/02, the President acted on this, claiming Senate opponents were "more interested in special interests in Washington and not interested in the security of the American people." When senators asked for an apology, the head of Bush's legislative team said there will be no apology because "there has been no attempt on [Bush's] part to politicize the war."
On 10/11/02, AP reported that an advertisement was aired against triple-amputee Vietnam war hero Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA) "that showed pictures of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden and implied the Democratic incumbent is soft on homeland security." Instead of invoking his pledge not to use 9/11 and the War on Terrorism "as a political issue," the President Bush effectively condoned the tactic by repeatedly making campaign appearances on behalf of Saxby Chambliss, who was airing the ad. Even now, the White House has refused to discredit the statement by Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK) that opposing the Bush Administration means "Osama bin Laden wins."..."
9/9/04 - [link]: "And it did not stop there. The Bush team's first political ads featured grisly images of firefighters carrying flag-draped coffins out of the rubble of the World Trade Center. But the spots backfired after firefighters and 9/11 victims' families accused the campaign of seeking to exploit the attacks for political gain.
Republicans were forced to adopt alternative tactics, this time through mythmaking. In the spring, Representative Tom Cole of Oklahoma told a group of Republicans that "if George Bush loses the election, Osama bin Laden wins the election." He was echoed by the right-wing media. One nationally syndicated columnist wrote, "Which candidate does our enemy want to lose? George W. Bush." Fox News pundit Monica Crowley similarly observed, "America's adversaries want to see John Kerry elected." Later that month, Republican political operatives commissioned an "independent" poll that purported to find that "60 percent of registered voters believed that terrorists would support John Kerry in this year's presidential elections." The poll was so suspect that only the right-wing media reported it. But it helped advance the story.
By May, CNN Justice Department correspondent Kelli Arena "reported" that there was "some speculation that Al Qaeda believes it has a better chance of winning in Iraq if John Kerry is in the White House."...
On May 26 Attorney General John Ashcroft held a dramatic press conference announcing that Al Qaeda was "almost ready to attack the United States" and had the "specific intention to hit the United States hard." But Ashcroft did not provide any new or specific information, the Homeland Security Department did not raise the terrorism threat alert level, and a senior Administration official told the New York Times that there was "no real new intelligence" to substantiate the warning.
In July, two days after Kerry selected John Edwards as his running mate, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge held a press conference of his own to say that "Al Qaeda is moving forward with its plans to carry out a large-scale attack in the United States." Again, he did not elaborate on what was new about his statement and was forced to admit, "We lack precise knowledge about time, place and method of attack."
That same month, The New Republic reported that top Pakistani security officials were being pressured by the Bush Administration to announce the capture of high-value terrorist targets during the Democratic National Convention. The White House responded with a standard denial, and the rest of the media ultimately brushed it off as an uncorroborated conspiracy theory.
But on July 29, just hours before Kerry's keynote address, Pakistan announced the capture of Al Qaeda suspect Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani. Curiously, he had been apprehended five days earlier. Even more suspect: The announcement was made at midnight Pakistani time, when most Pakistanis were asleep, but at the perfect time to coincide with America's prime-time television news schedule.
A few days later--during the period when attention to nominee Kerry would traditionally lead to a bounce in popularity--Ridge announced that he was raising the threat level in New York City, Northern New Jersey and the District of Columbia to "Code Orange." He claimed the threat level was being raised because of "new and unusually specific information about where Al Qaeda would like to attack." Undermining his claim that "we don't do politics in the Department of Homeland Security," he wove a campaign-style endorsement of the President into his warning: "We must understand that the kind of information available to us today is the result of the President's leadership in the war against terror," Ridge declared just a few breaths after invoking frightening images of "explosives," "weapons of mass destruction" and "biological pathogens."
But Ridge neglected to mention that most of the information was at least three years old, much of it surveillance data that had been collected before 9/11. Ridge also conceded that New York City--which was already at "Code Orange" before his announcement--would not raise its level of alert..."
IN SHORT:
We will absolutely and constantly use 9/11 or national security or war as a political issue

1.15 Richard Clarke being out of the loop [via Brad DeLong]

FLIP
March 2004 - [Cheney for Bush]: "Well, he wasn't in the loop frankly on a lot of this stuff"
IN SHORT:
Richard Clarke was out of the loop on a lot of the antiterrorism policy discussions

FLOP
March 2004 
[Rice for Bush]: ""I would not use the word `out of the loop,'... He was in every meeting that was held on terrorism," Ms. Rice said. "All the deputies' meetings, the principals' meeting that was held and so forth, the early meetings after Sept. 11."..."
[Wilkinson for Bush]: "I would say, I would remind you that Dick Clarke was in charge of counterterrorism policy when the African embassies were bombed. Dick Clarke was in charge of counterterrorism policy when the USS Cole was bombed. Dick Clarke was in charge of counterterrorism policy in the time preceding 9/11 when the threat was growing."
IN SHORT:
Richard Clarke was actually NOT out of the loop on a lot of the antiterrorism policy discussions

1.16 Richard Clarke's Meeting with Bush [via Brad DeLong]

FLIP
March 2004 - [Hadley and McClellan for Bush]: 
"HADLEY: We can not find evidence that this [Situation Room] conversation [about links between Al Qaeda and Iraq] between Mr. Clarke and the President [on September 12, 2001] ever occurred.
McCLELLAN: Let's just step backwards -- regardless, regardless, put that aside. There's no record of the President being in the Situation Room on that day that it was alleged to have happened, on the day of September the 12th. When the President is in the Situation Room, we keep track of that."
IN SHORT:
There's no evidence that the meeting that Richard Clarke claimed to have with Bush ever happened (this is the meeting in which Bush pressured him about Iraq rather than Al Qaeda). 

FLOP
March 2004 - [Bartlett and Hadley for Bush]: 
"White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett on the Newshour with Jim Lehrer -- text and audio. "I'm not here to dispute that there wasn't a conversation and the fact that President Bush didn't ask questions about Iraq, I'm sure he did and I'm glad he did..."
HADLEY: But the point I think we're missing in this is of course the President wanted to know [on September 12] if there was any evidence linking Iraq to 9/11."
IN SHORT:
The meeting that Richard Clarke claimed to have with Bush actually did happen and that was a good thing (this is the meeting in which Bush pressured him about Iraq rather than Al Qaeda). 

1.17 Homeland Security Department [via CAP]

FLIP
3/19/02 - [Fleischer for Bush]: "So, creating a Cabinet office [Depart of Homeland Security] doesn't solve the problem. You still will have agencies within the federal government that have to be coordinated. So the answer is that creating a Cabinet post doesn't solve anything."
IN SHORT:
Bush against creating Department of Homeland Security

FLOP
6/6/02 - [Bush]: "So tonight, I ask the Congress to join me in creating a single, permanent department with an overriding and urgent mission: securing the homeland of America and protecting the American people."
IN SHORT:
Bush FOR creating Department of Homeland Security

1.18 Independent 9/11 Commission [via CAP]

FLIP
5/23/02 - [Link]: "President Bush took a few minutes during his trip to Europe Thursday to voice his opposition to establishing a special commission to probe how the government dealt with terror warnings before Sept. 11."
5/27/02 - [Rice for Bush]: "...appearing on "Fox News Sunday," said the administration opposed any probe outside the congressional intelligence committees because a war against terrorism was still underway. "We worry about anything that would take place outside of the intelligence committees, and indeed, we think the intelligence committees are the proper venue for this kind of review."..."
IN SHORT:
Against an Independent Commission to investigate 9/11

FLOP
09/20/02 - [Bush]: "President Bush said today he now supports establishing an independent commission to investigate the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks."
IN SHORT:
FOR an Independent Commission to investigate 9/11

1.19 Time Extension for 9/11 Commission [via CAP]

FLIP
1/19/04 - [Link]: "...President George W. Bush and House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) have decided to oppose granting more time to an independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks, virtually guaranteeing that the panel will have to complete its work by the end of May, officials said last week..."
IN SHORT:
Against an extension of the 9/11 Commission's deadline

FLOP
2/4/04 - [Link]: "The White House announced Wednesday its support for a request from the commission investigating the September 11, 2001 attacks for more time to complete its work." 
IN SHORT:
FOR an extension of the 9/11 Commission's deadline

1.20 One hour time limit for Bush testimony before 9/11 Commission [via CAP]

FLIP
2/26/04 - [Link]: "President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have placed strict limits on the private interviews they will grant to the federal commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks, saying that they will meet only with the panel's top two officials and that Mr. Bush will submit to only a single hour of questioning, commission members said Wednesday."
IN SHORT:
[Bush] Will only submit to one hour of questioning by the 9/11 Commission

FLOP
3/10/04 - [Link]: "The president's going to answer all of the questions they want to raise. Nobody's watching the clock." 
IN SHORT:
[Bush] Will submit to questioning by the 9/11 Commission without time limits (but only if I'm allowed to holding hands with Dick Cheney)

1.21 Condi Rice testimony before 9/11 Commission [via CAP]

FLIP
3/9/04 - [McClellan for Bush/WH]: "Again, this is not her personal preference; this goes back to a matter of principle. There is a separation of powers issue involved here. Historically, White House staffers do not testify before legislative bodies. So it's a matter of principle, not a matter of preference."
IN SHORT:
Rice cannot testify as a matter of "principle"

3/30/04 - [Bush]: "Today I have informed the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States that my National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, will provide public testimony."
IN SHORT:
Rice can and will testify

1.22, 1.23 Uncovering Every Detail about 9/11, in a Timely Fashion

FLIP
11/27/02 - [Bush]: "...investigation should carefully examine all the evidence and follow all the fact, wherever they lead. We must uncover every detail and learn every lesson of September the 11th...We have a duty -- a solemn duty -- to do everything we can to protect this country...I also hope that the commission will act quickly and issue its report prior to the 18-month deadline embodied in the legislation. After all, if there's changes that need to be made, we need to know them as soon as possible, for the security of our country. The sooner we have the commission's conclusions, the sooner this administration will act on them..."
[Bush]: "I also hope that the commission will act quickly and issue its report prior to the 18-month deadline embodied in the legislation. After all, if there's changes that need to be made, we need to know them as soon as possible, for the security of our country. The sooner we have the commission's conclusions, the sooner this administration will act on them"
IN SHORT:
9/11 Commission should investigate EVERY DETAIL and EVERY BIT of evidence and ACT QUICKLY in revealing what went wrong since that is our solemn duty

FLOPPITY FLOP
4/7/04 summary from the Center for American Progress: 

[The] White House has done everything it can to stall, impede and block the commission from doing its vital work.
WHITE HOUSE OPPOSED FORMATION OF COMMISSION: President Bush and Vice President Cheney both contacted then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle in the months after 9/11 to insist on strict limits in the scope of any investigation into the attacks. And despite entreaties from the families of victims of 9/11 attacks and a bipartisan group of senators and congressmen, the president vocally resisted forming an investigatory commission. President Bush only relented on November 27, 2002, a year after the attacks.

BUSH'S HAND-PICKED CO-CHAIRMAN STEPS DOWN: On November 27, 2002, President Bush appointed Henry Kissinger to head the 9/11 Commission.. At the time, the NYT opined the White House had chosen him "to contain an investigation it has long opposed." Less than a month later, Kissinger resigned from the post over conflicts of interest.

WHITE HOUSE RESISTED FULL FUNDING: Time Magazine reported last year that the White House "brushed off" a request by Commission Chairman Tom Kean to boost the investigation's budget by $11 million, even though the commission stated it could not complete the investigation without the funds.

WHITE HOUSE OPPOSED TIME EXTENSION FOR FINISHING COMMISSION'S WORK: In January 2004, President Bush and House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) opposed granting a two-month extension, even though commission members said the extra time was necessary in order to finish its work. Two weeks later, after public outcry, the White House capitulated, announcing on February 4, 2004 that it would allow the commission to have the extra 60 days it needed to finish its work.

WHITE HOUSE DENIES REQUEST FOR PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFS: The commission has struggled with the White House for access to the "Presidential Daily Brief" (PDB), a document presented to the President each morning with that day's intelligence. After months of negotiations, the White House limited access to the PDBs to only four commissioners, who then would brief the full 10-member panel. However, although the four-member team "asked to look at 360 PDBs dating back to 1998; White House counsel Alberto Gonzales permitted them to see just 24."

WHITE HOUSE DENIES ACCESS TO PANEL'S OWN NOTES: After limiting the number of commissioners who could view the Presidential Daily Briefs, the White House then refused to give the panel access to notes commissioners with access had taken on them. On March 14, 2004, 15 months after the creation of the commission, the White House finally agreed to provide the commission with a 17-page summary of president's Daily Briefs from the Bush and Clinton administrations related to al Qaeda.

PRESIDENT'S CHIEF COUNSEL TRIES TO INFLUENCE PANEL: Top White House counsel Alberto Gonzales tried to manipulate the 9/11 Commission, calling Republican commissioners Fred F. Fielding and James R. Thompson just before they gathered March 24, 2004 to hear the testimony of former White House counterterrorism chief Richard A. Clarke. After the calls, "Fielding and Thompson presented evidence questioning the former official's credibility," leading critics to denounce the impropriety of Gonzales's phone calls.

WHITE HOUSE REFUSES TO ALLOW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO TESTIFY: On March 28, 2004, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice tried to justify her resistance to testifying in front of the commission, saying, "Nothing would be better, from my point of view, than to be able to testify. I would really like to do that. But there is an important principle here ... it is a longstanding principle that sitting national security advisers do not testify before the Congress." Faced with the reality that former top White House officials Lloyd Cutler, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Berger and John Podesta appeared before congressional committees while serving as advisers to presidents, as well as a photo showing Adm. William Leahy, chief of staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, appearing before the special congressional panel investigating the Pearl Harbor attacks, the White House finally bowed to pressure on March 30, 2004 and announced Rice would testify in public under oath before the commission.

WHITE HOUSE DEMANDS PANEL NOT SEEK ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY: In exchange for Rice's testimony, the White House specifically demanded that "the panel agree not to seek testimony from other White House aides," even if that testimony becomes critical to the commission's mandate.

WHITE HOUSE TRIES TO LIMIT BUSH'S TESTIMONY TO ONE HOUR: On February 25, 2004, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney announced "strict limits" surrounding their private interviews to the 9/11 Commission, saying Bush would submit to only a single hour of questioning. On March 2, 2004, the commission rejected the hour deadline as unacceptable. A week later, on March 10, 2004, White House spokesman Scott McClellan backtracked on the demand, saying, "The president's going to answer all of the questions they want to raise. Nobody's watching the clock."

WHITE HOUSE DEMANDS JOINT BUSH/CHENEY TESTIMONY: The White House has also demanded that President Bush and Vice President Cheney not be forced to testify under oath and be allowed to testify together, facilitating the potential coordination of their testimony. Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, members of the commission, have said they would prefer them to testify separately.

WHITE HOUSE HOLDS BACK DOCUMENTS: On April 1, 2004, it was discovered that the Bush White House had not turned over about 75 percent of the almost 11,000 pages of Clinton records "that document custodians had determined should be released to the commission investigating the terrorist attacks" to the commission, even though the records were vital to the panel's mission. Clinton "had given authorization to the National Archives to gather evidence from Mr. Clinton's files that was sought by the independent Commission...But the Bush administration...had final authority to decide what would be turned over."

Also see here.

IN SHORT:
9/11 Commission should investigate NOT EVERY DETAIL and NOT EVERY BIT of evidence and NOT NECESSARILY ACT QUICKLY in revealing what went wrong since that is our solemn duty.

1.24 National Intelligence Director

FLIP
8/2/04 - [Link]: "President Bush is urging the creation of a national intelligence director, but some lawmakers wonder whether the post he's proposed will have enough power to get the nation's 15 sometimes turf-conscious spy agencies working in concert...Critics contend without complete budgetary control, the new chief would have little real clout, CBS Correspondent Thalia Assuras reports...Democratic Sen. Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, also questioned the president's decision, saying that "if the new director cannot control the budgets of intelligence agencies, this new position will be no more than window dressing...Andy Card, the White House chief of staff, insisted the national intelligence director would have "an awful lot of clout, an awful lot of power" even though he lacked the authority to set the budget for individual intelligence agencies..."
8/6/04 - [link]: "This past week, President Bush announced that he was creating a national intelligence director, but his concept of the job differs radically from what the 9/11 commission has in mind or what Congress was considering a dozen years ago. Bush's NID is strictly advisory in nature, with no Cabinet slot, no office in the West Wing, no authority over priorities, personnel, or budgets."
IN SHORT:
There should be a National Intelligence Director WITHOUT full budgetary authority for the various agencies 

FLOP
9/8/04 - [link]: "President Bush shifted his stance today on how much power a new national intelligence director should have, declaring that he supports giving the new chief full power over intelligence spending. "We believe that there ought to be a national intelligence director who has full budgetary authority," Mr. Bush said before meeting with Congressional leaders who have supervisory functions over the far-flung intelligence bureaucracy."
IN SHORT:
There should be a National Intelligence Director WITH full budgetary authority for the various agencies 

1.25 Access to Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) - Part 1

FLIP
2002 - [Link]: "...The extraordinary access that top Bush administration officials gave Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward more than two years ago for his book, “Bush at War”...The best selling “Bush at War” is sprinkled with a number of precise references to the PDBs. On page 40 of the book, for example, Woodward quotes from the Sept. 12, 2001 PDB 
that CIA director George Tenet gave Bush linking the terror attacks to Al Qaeda. On page 132, Woodward gives the exact title—“Trying to Anticipate the Next Attack” -of a “highly classified, three-page briefing paper” that was provided to Bush on Sept. 25 as part of that morning’s PDB..."
IN SHORT:
It is A-OK to provide access to highly classified PDBs (even to commoners like journalists)

FLOP
4/7/04 summary from the Center for American Progress: 

WHITE HOUSE DENIES REQUEST FOR PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFS: The commission has struggled with the White House for access to the "Presidential Daily Brief" (PDB), a document presented to the President each morning with that day's intelligence. After months of negotiations, the White House limited access to the PDBs to only four commissioners, who then would brief the full 10-member panel. However, although the four-member team "asked to look at 360 PDBs dating back to 1998; White House counsel Alberto Gonzales permitted them to see just 24."

WHITE HOUSE DENIES ACCESS TO PANEL'S OWN NOTES: After limiting the number of commissioners who could view the Presidential Daily Briefs, the White House then refused to give the panel access to notes commissioners with access had taken on them. 

IN SHORT:
It is NOT A-OK to provide access to highly classified PDBs to the 9/11 Commission

1.26 Access to PDBs - Part 2

FLIP
Jan 2004 - [Article]: "...the White House has consistently refused to turn over any PDBs to outside investigators. White House counsel Alberto Gonzales and his staff have portrayed the documents as the "crown jewels" of executive privilege and argued that sharing them with anybody would jeopardize the ability of all future presidents to receive briefings on highly sensitive intelligence matters in confidence..."
IN SHORT:
It is NOT OK to provide access to highly classified PDBs to the 9/11 Commission

FLOP
4/7/04 summary from the Center for American Progress: 

he commission has struggled with the White House for access to the "Presidential Daily Brief" (PDB), a document presented to the President each morning with that day's intelligence. After months of negotiations, the White House limited access to the PDBs to only four commissioners, who then would brief the full 10-member panel. However, although the four-member team "asked to look at 360 PDBs dating back to 1998; White House counsel Alberto Gonzales permitted them to see just 24."
...
After limiting the number of commissioners who could view the Presidential Daily Briefs, the White House then refused to give the panel access to notes commissioners with access had taken on them. On March 14, 2004, 15 months after the creation of the commission, the White House finally agreed to provide the commission with a 17-page summary of president's Daily Briefs from the Bush and Clinton administrations related to al Qaeda.

IN SHORT:
It is OK to provide access to highly classified PDBs to the 9/11 Commission

1.27 Declassifying August 6, 2001 PDB

FLIP
Jan 2004 - [Article]: "...the White House has consistently refused to turn over any PDBs to outside investigators. White House counsel Alberto Gonzales and his staff have portrayed the documents as the "crown jewels" of executive privilege and argued that sharing them with anybody would jeopardize the ability of all future presidents to receive briefings on highly sensitive intelligence matters in confidence..."
IN SHORT:
It is NOT OK to declassify the highly classified 8/6/01 PDB

FLOP
As is common knowledge now, the PDB was declassified and released to the public after Condi Rice's testimony to the 9/11 Commission in early April 2004.
IN SHORT:
It is A-OK to declassify the highly classified 8/6/01 PDB

1.28 Providing 9/11 Commission Access to Clinton archives

FLIP
4/1/04 - [McClellan for Bush]: "...said some Clinton administration documents had been withheld because they were "duplicative or unrelated," while others were withheld because they were "highly sensitive" and the information in them could be relayed to the commission in other ways...."
IN SHORT:
Will NOT let the 9/11 Commission review thousands of documents from the Clinton administration 

FLOP
4/3/04 - [Link]: "The Bush administration agreed yesterday to let the commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks review about 9,000 pages of documents from the Clinton archives, which the White House had earlier refused to release, despite the conclusion of federal researchers that they were relevant to the panel's work.
The agreement, announced by White House spokesman Scott McClellan and confirmed by commission officials, was aimed at cutting short another high-profile battle between the administration and the Sept. 11 panel in the midst of the presidential election campaign. The Bush White House has feuded with the commission repeatedly over access to documents and witnesses, and this week capitulated to demands for public testimony from national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.
But in comments to reporters in Huntington, W.Va., McClellan declined to say whether the White House would agree to actually hand over any of the documents at issue, raising the possibility of further disputes."
IN SHORT:
WILL let the 9/11 Commission review thousands of documents from the Clinton administration 

1.29 Respect for the Dead

FLIP
2003 - [Link]: "As the nation headed for war last year, President Bush "clamped down" on the media, extending and expanding a controversial policy that banned reporters from photographing flag-draped caskets of soldiers killed in combat ¹. The White House said the policy was enforced to "spare the feelings of military families."..."
IN SHORT:
Showing flag-draped caskets of people who died in terrorist attacks or war is inappropriate since it may hurt the families of the dead.

FLOP
2004 - [Link]: "Yet, in the very first television advertisement of his 2004 campaign, the president has blanketed the nation's airwaves with an image of "firefighters carrying a flag-draped body" from the 9/11 wreckage at Ground Zero ³.
The hypocrisy of preventing Americans from receiving a "reminder of the toll of war" at the very same time the president exploits an image of a dead body for his own political gain has caused an outrage among victims' families ⁴. Chris Burke, whose brother Tom died in the attacks, said, "Using my dead friends and my dead brother for political expediency is dead wrong. It's wrong, it's bad taste and an insult to the 3,000 people who died on Sept. 11." ⁵"
More here.
IN SHORT:
Showing flag-draped caskets of people who died in terrorist attacks or war is appropriate since it may help me motivate my sheep base.

1.30 Release of Statistics on use of Patriot Act

FLIP
October 2002 - [Link]: "...in October 2002, the ACLU and other groups filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit asking a federal court to order the Department of Justice to account for its use of the extraordinary new surveillance powers under the Patriot Act, including Section 215.  The Department of Justice has not only refused to release basic statistics about how often these powers are being used, it has reacted to increased public concern about sensitive records, such as library and bookstore records, by...claiming these new powers apply only to foreign spies or terrorists.  In actuality, this limit is one of the safeguards that the USA PATRIOT Act lifted...."
IN SHORT:
Statistics on how the Government is using certain, secret PATRIOT ACT related powers cannot be released since that will compromise national security

FLOP
May 2004 - [Link] "...The Bush administration is coming under fire for allegedly allowing political concerns to determine what it deems to be sensitive national security material after a series of document declassifications that critics contend 
were timed for strategic advantage. In several recent cases, the administration first refused requests for information by saying that releasing it would jeopardize national security, then released that same information itself at a moment when 
it became politically convenient to do so -- leaving the impression that it was safe to release all along. After first refusing to allow Congress to see a memo about Al Qaeda from a month before the 2001 attacks, and then letting only some of the 9/11 Commission see it in private, the White House released the entire document to quell rising public pressure. After the Justice Department fought the American Civil Liberties Union in court to suppress statistics on how often it used the Patriot Act, Attorney General John Ashcroft called a news conference and announced them..."
IN SHORT:
Statistics on how the Government is using secret PATRIOT ACT related powers CAN be released since that will NOT compromise national security

1.31 Terrorism attacks in 2003

FLIP
4/29/04 - [Link]: "On April 29, the department released the report's 2003 edition with considerable fanfare. Presenting its optimistic findings at a special press conference were Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Ambassador at Large J. Cofer Black, the former CIA official who serves as the department's coordinator for counterterrorism. While acknowledging that terror continues to take a terrible toll, Armitage emphasized that the United States is fighting back with a worldwide coalition of allies. "Indeed," he said, "you will find in these pages clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight." 
The "evidence" he cited was certainly impressive, and came complete with colorful bar graphs and charts. According to the report's summary, the number of terror attacks dropped last year to its lowest level since 1969 and had fallen by nearly half since the dark days of 2001. The report suggested that the American-led coalition has struck back very effectively against al-Qaida and its radical Islamist network."
IN SHORT:
Terrorist attacks in 2003 fell to a 35 year low! We are prevailing in the fight against terrorism! Yay!

FLOP
4/29/04 - [Link]: "The moment of truth came on May 17. A sharp Washington Post opinion piece by Princeton economist Alan Krueger and Stanford political scientist David Laitin sliced "Patterns 2003" to shreds. Their review showed that the "number of significant terrorist acts increased from 124 in 2001 to 169 in 2003," or 36 percent, and that "the number of terrorist events has risen each year since 2001, and in 2003 reached its highest level in more than 20 years." The professors accused the government of concocting a misleading picture by combining the statistics for all "terrorist" acts, whether or not they were "significant." The number of "nonsignificant" terrorist incidents dropped -- but as the professors noted drily, that fact is itself "nonsignificant" and was used to create a phony statistic. By the State Department's own standards, its conclusions were false.
The same day, Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., sent a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell complaining about the terror report. As Waxman pointed out, the analysts who compiled the data on "significant terrorist events" had closed their books for 2003 on a curious date. Instead of including every incident up till Dec. 31, they had included none that occurred after Nov. 11. That decision, which supposedly reflected printing deadlines, rather conveniently excluded several deadly incidents -- notably the multiple deadly bombings in Istanbul that killed dozens and wounded hundreds on Nov. 15 and 20.
To the State Department's credit, its response to Waxman's criticism was swift and candid by administration standards. The statement issued by spokesman Richard Boucher credited the Los Angeles Democrat and noted that the department itself "did not check and verify the data sufficiently." While the department's revisions aren't ready yet, Boucher also noted that "our preliminary results indicate that the figures for the number of attacks and casualties will be up sharply from what was published."..."
6/9/04 - [Link]: "State Department officials said they underreported the number of terrorist attacks in the report on 2003, and added that they expected to release an updated version soon. 
Several U.S. officials and terrorism experts familiar with that revision effort said the new report could well show that the number of significant terrorist incidents actually increased last year, perhaps to its highest level in 20 years."
6/22/04 - [Rep. Henry Waxman]: "Although the revised report is a major improvement, I believe it continues to undercount worldwide terrorism. It fails to count hundreds of terrorist attacks that have occurred in Iraq against oil pipelines, electricity plants, and other infrastructure and facilities that the U.S. is funding and building. The revised report also appears to undercount other terrorist events, such as potentially hundreds of incidents against U.S. interests in Colombia. There is a clear message in the new data: measured by the number of incidents, major terrorist attacks are increasing."
6/29/04 - [link]: ""Unfortunately, the data that is within the report, the actual numbers of incidents, is off, it's wrong," Powell said. "And I am regretful that this has happened."..."
IN SHORT:
Terrorist attacks in 2003 rose to a 20 year high! We are NOT prevailing in the fight against terrorism! 
P.S. [Warning: Gratuitous remarks ahead.] Well, no we are, well you know..."war on terror", "9/11", "Iraq", "war on terror", All Sheep Must Vote for Dear Leader or Face Terrorist Attacks.

1.32 International Terrorism Cases in 2002 Fiscal Year

[BONUS]
Terrorism Charges Filed in early 2003
Jan-Feb 2003 - [Link]: "...In the first two months of this year, the Justice Department filed "terrorism" charges against 56 people..."
IN SHORT:
We filed terrorism charges against 56 people in the first two months of 2003.

1.33 Strategic use of armed forces

FLOP
9/7/03 - [Bush]: "...Two multinational divisions, led by the British and the Poles, are serving alongside our forces -- and in order to share the burden more broadly, our commanders have requested a third multinational division to serve in Iraq..."
8/27/04 - [Link]: "President Bush acknowledged for the first time on Thursday that he had miscalculated post-war conditions in Iraq, the New York Times reported. 
The paper quoted Bush as saying during a 30-minute interview that he made "a miscalculation of what the conditions would be" in post-war Iraq...Bush said his strategy had been "flexible enough" to respond. "We're adjusting to our conditions" in places like Najaf, the paper quoted him as saying."
Also see here.
IN SHORT:
We "miscalculated" the needs for the size of the force [a very generous interpretation since we simply told Eric Shinseki to keep quiet when he told us we were "miscalculating"] needed to accomplish the mission; the exit strategy is "flexible". 

1.34 Military Equipment Readiness

FLOP
3/19/04 - [Rice for Bush, defending why the ARMED Predator drone was not unleashed on Afghanistan pre-9/11]: "Well, we did think about how fast we could accelerate the work on the Predator.  But you always have to be careful to make sure that you're going to have something that works.  And the tests had not been conclusive. In fact, the tests had — had shown some of the limitations in the warhead. "
IN SHORT:
There's no point trying to implement a missile/arms delivery system that doesn't work well and which tests have shown limitations on.

FLIP
Flashback - a few days earlier - [Link]: "Bush's budget for next year includes $10.7 billion for missile defense—over twice as much money as for any other single weapons system. This summer, he's planning to start deploying the first components of an MD system—six anti-missile missiles in Alaska, four in California, and as many as 20 more, in locations not yet chosen, the following year. 
Yet, except by sheer luck, these interceptors will not be able to shoot down enemy missiles. Or, to put it more precisely, Bush is starting to deploy very expensive weapons without the slightest bit of evidence that they have any chance of working.
In the past six years of flight tests, here is what the Pentagon's missile-defense agency has demonstrated: A missile can hit another missile in mid-air as long as a) the operators know exactly where the target missile has come from and where it's going; b) the target missile is flying at a slower-than-normal speed; c) it's transmitting a special beam that exaggerates its radar signature, thus making it easier to track; d) only one target missile has been launched; and e) the "attack" happens in daylight.
Beyond that, the program's managers know nothing—in part because they have never run a test that goes beyond this heavily scripted (it would not be too strong to call it "rigged") scenario.
...
There is, in other words, a vast distance between the Pentagon's current level of testing and the level that would need to be done before anyone could begin to claim that a missile-defense system might shoot down real enemy missiles in a real nuclear attack.
The latest annual report by Thomas Christie, the Pentagon's director of operational testing and evaluation, reveals just how incalculably vast this distance is. (The report was published with no fanfare at the end of last year and has appeared on private Web sites—but not the Pentagon's—in the past two weeks.)
Christie's bottom line is that we're rushing into this thing blind."
9/14/04 - [Link]: "The Washington Post reports that "critical new elements" of the Bush administration's high priority anti-missile system will not be tested again before being activated this autumn. The last chance for testing "appeared to vanish yesterday with the disclosure that the next flight test has been postponed until late this year, well past the November election." Against a backdrop of doubt surrounding the system's likely effectiveness, the Pentagon announced the system will nevertheless begin operating in the next month or two. "But the delay leaves the Pentagon pressing ahead with a system that will not have been flight-tested in nearly two years – and never with the actual interceptor that will be deployed."..."
IN SHORT:
Even if a missile delivery system is very very expensive to the taxpayer, doesn't work well and which tests have shown to have very serious limitations, we should implement it.